What was the hohenzollern candidature

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Oxford Academic. Google Scholar. Cite Cite C. Select Format Select format. Permissions Icon Permissions. Shortly after the interview between Benedetti and Thile, Theodor von Bernhardi, an homme de confiance of Bismarck, was sent to Spain as a military observer. Acton , Historical Essays and Studies, eds. Figgis and Laurence [London, ], p. MMP, p. The imperial ambassador to Spain was also in Paris at this time and was probably consulted regarding the Spanish dynastic problem.

I Prim had come to France for a vacation. He had arrived in Paris 27 August and had gone on to Vichy a few days later, remaining there for about two weeks. On his return to Spain, he had passed through Paris and had been received in audience by the emperor on 14 September and had left for Spain four days later.

After the refusal of the duke of Genoa, received in Madrid on 2 January , the search for a prospective ruler was temporarily held in abeyance. Although there were a number of candidates, few of them could expect to be considered very seriously.

Under the circumstances, the name of Leopold was again mentioned quite frequently. In early February , apparently in consequence of conferences held in Madrid in January, Prim decided to renew Spanish efforts to win Leopold over as a candidate.

In the absence o fLeopo. Although the Google Scholar. Same to same, Paris, 7 July o, ibid. The decision to send Benedetti to Ems was taken in conformity with the belief in Paris that inquiries directed at the Prussian, rather than the Spanish, government were more likely to bring clarification. After consulting with the emperor, and in the absence of ivier, Gramont instructed LeSourd in Berlin on 3 July to ask formally in Berlin whether or not the Prussian government was aware of the Spanish throne offer to Leopold.

On that same day, both he and ivier also discussed the matter with Ambassador Werther in Paris, who was about to leave for Ems. They left no doubt about the deep resentment felt in Paris over the prospect of a Prussian dynasty in Spain.

Although they had no proof that the Prussian government was involved in the matter, they stated that the secrecy of the affair might well prompt such a conclusion by Frenchmen. They impressed upon Werther their hope that King William would oppose a Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne, for Napoleon could not accept such a solution of the dynastic problem of Spain Gramont to LeSourd, Paris, 3 July o, ibid.

Tension was heightened on 6 July, when Gramont stated in the chamber that France would never tolerate a Prussian prince on the throne of Spain. Yet, thus far the French government had not obtained a full explanation in Berlin. With William in Ems and Bismarck in Varzin, there was little hope of penetrating the secrecy surrounding the candidacy. Gramont, La France et la Prusse avant la guerre [Paris, ], p. Saurel, p. I had to proceed therefore with an extreme moderation in order not to aggravate the situation which was already very difficult and very dangerous.

Lebenserinnerungen aus einem halben Jahrhundert, ed. Boschan Postdam, , p. It was felt that he should have refused to discuss the matter with Gramont and ivier and simply referred them to Madrid and Reichenhall. Werther to William, Paris, 5 July o, ibid.

During the evening hours of 9 July, King William received word from Charles Anton, who evidently was concerned about the reaction in Paris, that a voluntary renunciation was out of the question.

Rumors about military preparations filled the air and were reflected in official and semi-official correspondence Solms to foreign office, Paris, 9 July , T. I [], p. Hohenzollerisches Hausgesetz vom William was indeed greatly concerned about reports of French military preparations sent by Solms, whose impressions were also shared by Waldersee.

The king even considered returning to Berlin and was anxious that Roon be informed of the reports on military measures taken in France. Moreover, William was evidently willing to have Werther take a personal letter from him to Emperor Napoleon, and he also considered the possibility of appealing to the great powers to use their good offices. Bismarck, on the other hand, was opposed to such precipitate steps Waldersee report on Paris situation, Paris, 10 July Google Scholar.

LORD, p. Benedetti told Werther that he would remain in Ems, at his own risk, twenty-four hours longer, although an answer from the king was already expected that afternoon in Paris Abeken to foreign office, Ems, II July , LORD, p. Gramont to Benedetti,Paris, Io July , ibid.

French military preparations had also been initiated, indicating the degree to which war was thought a Google Scholar. During the forenoon of 12 July, Napoleon was called out of a council of ministers to receive the Spanish ambassador who had received word from Strat that Charles Anton was about to inform Prim of the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidacy. Benedetti was not alone in believing that the Hohenzollern withdrawal, if communicated by William to the French government in some suitable mode, would end the crisis.

Halperin , Diplomat under Stress. Visconti-Venosta and the Crisis of July, o [Chicago, x], p. The optimism of the diplomatic world was quite ill-founded. The reaction of the chamber did not augur well for the peace of Europe. All ivier could do was to delay debate on it. The fact that William had not ordered the withdrawal made it impossible for the French government to issue a statement to that effect.

Thus, no claim of having humiliated Prussia and forced her to abandon the Spanish throne project could be established by France. Yet, it was precisely for such a victory that the French public clamored. Gramont, at the foreign office, spent the afternoon of the 12th drafting communications to Benedetti, in which he stressed the necessity of associating William with the withdrawal and also indicated that the French government was prepared to wait further for official news.

In mid-afternoon, Gramont received Ambassador Werther with whom he discussed at length the implications of the crisis and the role of the Prussian king. He insisted that William had authorized the candidacy and that the monarch should therefore also take the responsibility for ending the crisis.

Gramont, supported by ivier who had joined the discussion, even proposed a draft suitable for a communication from William to Napoleon. This draft, stronger in its language than one Gramont had prepared before the meeting with Werther, actually had little effect on the course of events. It would appear then that Gramont dispatched the fateful message at 7 PM on the 12th.

Late in the evening, ivier called on Gramont and was shown a text of the message sent to Benedetti as well as a letter which Gramont had meanwhile received from the emperor in St. He could not, he felt, countermand a decision reached by the emperor and the foreign minister but did convince Gramont to send Benedetti additional instructions. These messages, dispatched at AM and AM on the 13th, tended to shift the emphasis from a general guarantee against a future recurrence of the candidacy to an immediate assurance.

The genesis of the Ems Dispatch may be traced back to the account of the events in Ems on the 13th, which William authorized Abeken to telegraph to Bismarck.

The king also gave explicit permission to the chancellor to inform the press and the German legations abroad of the guarantee demand presented by Benedetti and rejected by the monarch. Moreover, the wording itself lacked precision and tended to distort a few of the incidents. He wished to keep the controversy alive, depict France as the aggressor, and derive political advantage out of a situation which could be expected to rally Germans north and south of the Main.

Meisner [Leipzig, ], pp.